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THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION RECORD

Some Legal Aspects Of The Colorado Coal Strike
By EDWARD MILLER, Esq., of the Denver Bar

ON

half of the coal miners of the
October 18, 1927, about onelargest coal companies in the
Trinidad and Walsenburg districts in
the southern part of the State of Colorado went on strike. The State Industrial Commission took the position, and
probably properly so, that the strike
was illegal, basing its decision on substantial irregularities in the petition
addressed to it asking increased wages
and a change in working conditions in
all of the coal mines of the State. The
notice was filed September 6, 1927, and
was signed by six men, who, according
to a positive statement of the office of
the Attorney General in a letter to the
Industrial Commission, were not employees of the coal companies whose
miners went on strike; furthermore
the commission states that it "was
unable to find a single delegate" at a
conference previously held at Aguilar
"who was elected by his fellow workers
in a meeting assembled for that purpose". Accordingly, the commission
ruled that the strike notice was void
and the strike illegal, as to all employees who had failed to give the statutory. notice signed by themselves or
by a committee authorized for such
purpose. C. L. '21. Sec. 4353. "Employers and employees shall give to
the Industrial Commission and the one
to the other at least thirty days' prior
written notice of an intended change
affecting conditions of employment or
with respect to wages or hours." * * *
"Notice by said employees shall be
signed by said employees or members
of a committee of said employees authorized for such purpose."
The persuasive measure of picketing
was then employed and numerous
arrests followed, culminating on November 7th with the arrest of about

fifteen individuals who were supposedly the non-resident I. W. W. leaders of
the strike. They were immediately
incarcerated and according to the
newspaper reports, held incommunicado, and without bond.
These latter arrests were made by
special officers of the State Law Enforcement Department appointed by
the Governor, a department which was
originally intended for the enforcement of the State Prohibition Act. 0.
L. '21, Section 3723. "The Governor
of the State shall compel the enforcement of all provisions of this act (the
Intoxicating Liquor Act of 1915), and
for this purpose he may call upon any
State, District, County, precinct or municipal officer, or he may appoint such
agents as necessity may require * * *"
This section was construed by the
Colorado Supreme Court in the case
of Lee v. Morley, 79 Colo. 4181 in which
case the Court was called upon to declare invalid an executive order of the
Governor abolishing the law enforcement department.
The Court said,
page 484: "The heart of this dispute
lies in the phrase 'he (the Governor)
may appoint such agents as necessity
may require'. The filling of the office
or offices thus created was left to the
discretion of the Governor and he was
made the sole judge of the necessity."
But in 1918, this department came
under the Civil Service Amendment to
the Constitution, (Sec. 13, Art. XII, p.
66, C. L. '21), and with respect to that
the Court says, page 484:
"By the
terms of the civil service amendment
such agents, if appointed, come under
its provisions. If the Governor determines that ten are necessary, they
will be selected as the amendment
provides. If, in his opinion, the emergency passes and only one is required
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the rules of the commission will determine which one. If, however, the Governor reaches the conclusion that none
is necessary no question of selection
is presented and all must go. The discretion of the Governor to determine
the necessity, under such provisions
as the one here in question was settled
in People, et al. v. Milliken, 74 Colo.
456, 458; 223 Pac. 10." There is, however, in the Rules and Regulations of
the State Civil Commission a provision
authorizing provisional and emergency
appointments by the appointing power,
until such time as the Commission
shall give an examination and complete an eligible list. A number of the
men serving in the strike area had previously passed the civil service examination and were on the eligible list for
appointments.
Almost immediately after the arrest
of the leaders a large number of miners went back to work so that on
November 9th the numbers working
in the Trinidad and Walsenburg Districts totaled approximately seventy
per centum of the number employed on
October 15th.
A picture of the evolution of labor
law lends an interesting background
for a view of the Colorado situation.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in the case of Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 321, gives an interesting review, which is so comprehensive
as to justify_ extensive quotation:
"In England up until 1813 a workingman struggling to improve his condition even when acting singly was
confronted with laws limiting the
amount of wages which he might demand. Until 1824 he was punishable
as a criminal if he combined with his
fellow workmen to raise wages or
shorten hours or to affect the business
in any way even if there was no resort
to a strike. In 1871, members of a
union who joined in persuading employees to leave work were liable crim-

inally, although the employees were
not under contract and the persuasion
was both peaceful and unattended by
picketing. Until 1871, threatening a
strike, whatever the cause, was also
a criminal act. Not until 1875 was the
right of workers to combine in order
to attain their ends conceded fully. In
that year Parliament declared that
workmen combining in furtherance of
a trade dispute should not be indictable for criminal conspiracy unless the
act, if done by one person, would be
indictable as a crime * * *.

But pick-

eting, though peaceful, in aid of a
strike remained illegal; and likewise
the boycott. It was not until 1906 that
the ban on peaceful picketing and the
bringing of pressure upon an employer by means of a secondary strike or
a boycott was removed * * * In England the improvement of conditions of
workingmen and their emancipation
appear to have been deemed recently
the paramount public need."
"In the United States the rules of the
common law governing the struggle
between employer and employee have
likewise been subjected to modification. These have been made mainly
through judicial decisions. The legal
right of working men to combine to
strike in order to secure for themselves higher wages, shorter hours
and better working conditions received early general recognition.
But
there developed great diversity of opinion as to the means by which and also
as to the persons through whom and
upon whom pressure might permissibly be exerted in order to induce the
employer to yield to the demands of
the working men.
Courts were required, in the absence of legislation,
to determine what the public welfare
demanded; whether it would not be
best subserved by leaving the contestants free to resort to any means not
involving a breach of the peace or injury to tangible property; whether it
was consistent with the public inter-
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est that the contestants should be permitted to invoke the aid of others not
directly interested in the matter in
controversy; and to what extent incidental injury to persons not parties
to the controversy should be held justifiable."
"The earliest reported American decision on peaceful picketing appears to
have been rendered in 1888 but the
doctrine was not established until
eight years later in the case of Vegelahn vs. Gunter, 167 Mass. 92. By no
great majority the prevailing public
opinion in American inclines towards
the legality of peaceful picketing. See
American Steel Foundries vs. Tri-City
Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 1841.
In some of the States, notably New
York, both peaceful picketing and the
boycott are declared permissible * * *
Judges, being thus called upon to exercise a quasi-legislative function and
weigh relative social values, naturally
differed in their conclusions on such
questions."
There then evolved in this country
such a tremendous use of the injunction in labor disputes as to cause considerable criticism concerning the
abuse of the injunction. The controversy over the remedy overshadowed
in bitterness the question of the relative substantive rights of the parties.
Thoughtful lawyers throughout the
land deplored the innovation of "government by injunction," which, it was
asserted, endangered the personal liberty of wage earners. If the injunction were violated, the charges were
heard before the judge issuing the injunction, without a jury, often upon
affidavit only, and without the opportunity of confronting or cross-examining witnesses. Men found guilty of
contempt were committed in the
judge's discretion without either a statutory limit upon the length of the imprisonment or the opportunity of effective review on appeal, or the right to

release on bail pending possible revisory proceedings. In effect the proceedings were criminal except that the
individual was denied the usual constitutional safeguards and privileges in
criminal proceedings.
That was the juristic conception in
1905 when the Colorado Legislature
passed a statute providing in effect
that picketing should be unlawful, and
that the violation of the statute should
be deemed a misdemeanor subject to
a fine of not less than $10.00 nor more
than $250.00, or imprisonment in the
County Jail not to exceed sixty days,
or both, in the discretion of the Court.
C. L. '21, Sections 4162 and 166.
The following constitutional provisions are also relevant: Colorado Constitution, Article II, Section, 10, Freedom of Speech: "That no law shall
be passed impairing the freedom of
speech; that every person shall be free
to speak, write, or publish whatever
he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuses of that privilege * *
•". Colorado Constitution, Article II,
Section 19: "That all persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties except
for capital offenses, when the proof is
evident or the presumption great".
The act of 1915, as amended, relating
to labor disputes between employers
and employees provides, as indicated
above, for notice, and the opportunity
of investigation and arbitration by the
State Industrial Commission of the
causes of dispute between the employer and employee. Should the employees strike without such notice or the
employer cause a lockout without
notice then ,itis legislatively declared
that an injunction may issue maintaining all conditions in statu quo until the dispute is investigated by the
Commission and a final decision made
by the Commission; with the proviso
that "nothing in this Act shall prohibit the suspension or discontinuance
* *

* of any industry or of the work-
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ings of any person therein which industry is not affected with a public
interest."
The employer guilty of a
lockout is subject to a fine of not more
than One Thousand Dollars or six
months in the county jail, or both, and
each day or part of a day of such lockout constitutes a separate offense. The
employee guilty of striking contrary
to the provisions of the act is subject
to a fine of not more than $50.00 or
imprisonment for not more than six
months in the county jail, or both, and
each day or part of a day constitutes
a separate offense. Another important
criminal section of the same act provides that any person who incites, encourages or aids in any manner any
employee to go or continue on strike
contrary to the act shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be subject to a
fine of not more than One Thousand
Dollars, or imprisonment for not more
than six months in the county jail, or
both.
The injunctive section of this act
(Section 30) was construed in the case
of People v. United Mine Workers of
America, 70 Colo. 269. where the constitutionality of the statute was questioned, but sustained by the Supreme
Court. The Court said, at page 271:
"Unless coal mining may be said to be
affected with a'public interest its regulation by statute to the extent attempted by said chapter is unconstitutional.
The words 'affected with a public interest' were no doubt used by the General Assembly to keep the statute within constitutional limits. It becomes
necessary, then, not only in order to
construe the statute but to decide
whether it is constitutional, to determine whether coal mining is so affected; and it seems self-evident that it is.
We must take judicial notice of what
has taken place in this and other
States and that the coal industry is
vitally related not only to all other industries but to the health and even the
life of the people. Food, shelter and

heat, before all others, are the great
necessities of life, and in modern life,
heat means coal."
In the case of American ,iteelFoundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 193, at page 202, the court
construed Section 20 of the Clayton
Act of October 15, 1914, which provided
"That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any Court of
the United States in any case between
an employer and employees * * * involving, or growing out of, a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a
property right, of the party making
the application * * *". Mr. Chief Justice Taft says:
"It is clear that Congress wished to forbid the use by the
Federal Courts of their equity arm to
prevent peaceable persuasion by employees, discharged or expectant, in
promotion of their side of the dispute,
and to secure them against judicial restraint in obtaining or communicating
information in any place where they
might lawfully be. This introluces no
new principle into the equity jurisprudence of those Courts.
It is merely
declaratory of what was the best practice always. Congress thought it wise
to stabilize the rule of action and render it uniform."
"We are a social people, and the accosting by one of another in an inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with
a view to influencing the other's action, are not regarded as aggression
or a violation of that other's rights.
If, however, the offer is declined, as it
may rightfully be, then persistence,
importunity, following and dogging,
become unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction which is likely soon to savor
of intimidation."
On the same day that this case was
finally argued before the United States
Supreme Court, the case of Truax v.
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Corrigan, Supra, was also finally
argued. In that case, by a five to four
decision, a statute of the State of Arizona, similar in import and intention
and almost identical in language, with
that of Section 20 of the Clayton Act
was under discussion. But there the
Court held that the State had exceeded
its sovereign authority by depriving
an owner of a business of his property without due process of law, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft said
there, at page 340 "We held in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council
that under these clauses picketing was
unlawful, and that it might be enjoined as such, and that peaceful picketing
was a contradiction in terms which the
statute sedulously avoided, but that,
subject to the primary right of the
employer and his employees and would
be employees to free access to his
premises, without obstruction by violence, intimidation, annoyance, importunity or dogging, it was lawful for exemployees on a strike and their fellows in a labor union to have a single
representative at each entrance to the
plant of the employer to announce the
strike and peaceably to persuade the
employees and would-be employees to
join them in it. We held that these
clauses were merely declaratory of
what had always been the law and the
best practice in equity, and we thus
applied them. The construction put
upon the same words by the Arizona
Supreme Court makes those clauses of
Section 1464 (the Arizona statute) as
far from those of Section 20 of the
Clayton Act in meaning as if they were
in wholly different language."
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting said:
"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an
important part of the community de-

s-res, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States."
In this 'insulated chamber' known
as the sovereign State of Colorado, at
the time of the commencement of the
strike we had taken the position that
picketing was illegal and that striking
without notice was illegal. In respect
to picketing, Colorado was committed
to the same policy as the States of New
Jersey, Minnesota and Pennsylvania.
It has been suggested that because
of the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Wolff
Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations of the State of Kansas,
267 U. S. 552, that Court might declare
the Colorado Act unconstitutional as
being an attempt at compulsory arbitration, and hence a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Such
a conclusion, is doubtful, since the
Colorado act is, at most, an attempt to
induce voluntary arbitration, and to
stay the strike temporarily. The recent pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in the case of Dorchy v. Kansas,
272 U. S. 306, that "neither the common
law nor the Fourteenth Amendment
confers an absolute right to strike," is
important in that connection.
In this jurisdiction there were several lines of statutory procedure which
could have been followed. Assuming
that the employees had not given proper notice of the strike, the State upon
proper warrant could have arrested all
pickets and all strikers subject, however, to the right of the pickets and
strikers to bond and an early trial.
The State also had the right to injunctive relief maintaining the status quo
between employer and employee, in addition to the right to arrest any individual inciting, encouraging, or aiding
in the strike, subject, however, to the
right of such defendants to bond and
an early trial.
No injunction issued. Some pickets
were arrested and released on bond but
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alized and abandoned and we could not
the strike was unimpaired. A truce
answer any messages. The men went
was agreed on between the strikers
back to work and the ranks were
and the Governor, embodying the cesbroken and the strike was brokensation of picketing. The truce was
not by the army, and not by any other
short-lived and picketing was resumed.
power, but simply and solely by the
The Governor then appointed special
action of the United States courts in
enforcement
law
the
as
acting
officers
restraining us from discharging our
department to enforce the anti-picketduties as officers and representatives
conin
acting
group,
This
ing statute.
of our employees."
junction with local officers, arrested
every known leader of the I. W. W. enWe have sought to give an unbiased
couraging the strike, placed them in
review of the legal and illegal steps
jail, and held them without bail. The
taken in the strike. It is only through
effect was readily apparent. Without
the constant and impartial maintenleadership the strikers in the southern
ance of the constitutional rights of all
fields began to return to work. On
men, employers and employees, rich
November 10th a Petition for a Writ
and poor, that we can hope to preserve
of Habeas Corpus was filed in the
the just faith in a constitutional form
United States District Court at Den- of government.
Might never made
ver on behalf of the prisoners but up
right, although it has often disguised
until November 18th the defendants
itself in that cloak, to be later exposed
were still in jail and no step farther
and disgraced as an imposter.
toward the goal of freedom, except
that it then became known that
charges had been filed against the defendants and that it was possible for
them to secure their release on bond.
The habeas corpus proceedings were
then dismissed on motion of the peti(Editor's Note.-It is intended In each
tioners.
issue of the Record to note interesting
current decisions of all local Trial Courts,
In the southern field it was a condiincluding the United States District Court,
State District Courts, the County Court,
tion somewhat analogous to that deand the Justice Courts. The co-operation
of the members of the Bar is solicited in
scribed in the case of In re Debs, 158 U.
making this department a success. Any
S. 5611, 597, quoting from the testimony
attorney having knowledge of such a decision is requested to phone or mail the
of one of the defendants before the
title of the case to Victor Arthur Miller,
who will digest the decision for this deUnited States Strike Commission: "As
partment. The names of the Courts havsoon as the employees found that we
ing no material for the current month will
be omitted, due to lack of space.)
were arrested and taken from the
scene of action they became demoralized and that ended the strike. It was
DIVISION 5
not the soldiers that ended the strike;
JUDGE CHARLES SACKMAN
it was not the old brotherhoods that
People vs. Painless Parker Dentist
ended the strike. Our men were in a
Facts: Quo warranto to obtain writ
position that never would have been
of
ouster against the defendant, a Calishaken under any circumstances if we
fornia corporation, doing business in
had been permitted to remain upon the
Denver to prevent it from practising
field among them. Once we were taken
dentistry through employees and agents
from the scene of action and restrained
who are duly licensed in this state.
from sending telegrams or issuing orThe corporation has not and cannot
ders or answering questions, * * * our
headquarters were temporarily demor- get a license to practice dentistry.

Recent Trial Court
Decisions

